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Abstract
In this paper, I will argue that Giorgio Agamben has provided for a radical 
theory of the import of torture on human life, one that provides a different 
genealogy and projects different implications for the relation between torture 
and politics than have otherwise been given. I will begin by examining some 
of the features of the current, post-September 11 ‘debate’ about torture, before 
moving to an exegesis of Agamben’s theses and their import for thinking 
politics today.
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Resumen
En este ensayo, defenderé que Giorgio Agamben ha propuesto las bases 
de una teoría radical de la importancia de la tortura sobre la vida humana, 
que proporciona una diferente genealogía de la misma y proyecta diferentes 
implicaciones para la relación entre tortura y política de las que se han dado hasta 
la fecha. Quiero comenzar por examinar alguno de aquellos rasgos del debate 
actual sobre la tortura tras el 11 de septiembre, antes de pasar a una exégesis de las 
tesis de Agamben y su importancia para el pensamiento político actual. 
Palabras clave: tortura, vida humana, testimonio, lenguaje, política.
‘The goal of torture, in effect, is to produce acceptance of a State 
discourse, through the confession of putrescence. What the torturer 
in the end wants to extort from the victim he tortures is to reduce 
him to being no more than that [ça], rottenness.’ – Michel de 
Certeau
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1. Introduction: torture as the originary landscape of the political
Torture is the originary landscape of the political.1 Why? Because torture 
is, historically, pragmatically and in principle, the ‘technique’ that functions 
to effect the transition between the living body and the life of the community.2 
It does this not only according to the well-known exigencies of spectacular 
punishment, the establishment of the grounds for debt reclamation, and festive 
enjoyment, but, perhaps fundamentally, in its establishment of the conditions 
of what counts as a legitimate speech act in and for a polity at all.3 Torture is 
1 I would like to thank Birkbeck College London for hosting me as an Honorary Fellow in 
January 2012, where I completed the writing-up of this paper. Among the many staff and students 
who helped me finesse some of the points made here, I would particularly like to thank Anton 
Schütz and Thanos Zartaloudis for their incisive comments and suggestions.
2 S.C. Carey, Mark Gibney, S.C. Poe, The Politics of Human Rights: The Quest for Dignity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) obviously make a great deal of the Human 
Rights declarations. They note that no country voted against the Universal Declaration (1948), 
although eight countries abstained; also many countries were still under colonial rule. Moreover, 
noting problems with universality, they assert: ‘Still, human rights are universal in the sense that 
all human beings possess human rights by the mere fact of their human existence,’ p. 11. There 
is, moreover, an extraterritorial obligation of states who are signatories to the Convention against 
Torture (adopted by the UN General Assembly 10 December 1984 and ratified 26 June 1987). 
Carey et al. give three instance of the consequences of the extraterritorial obligation: 1) Jan 2009, 
Charles Taylor (not the philosopher!), a US Citizen and son of the ex-president of Liberia was 
convicted under 1994 US criminal law and sentenced to 99 years in prison, the only conviction 
so far; 2) Faryadi Sarwar Zardad, an Afghan warlord, arrested in London, 3 million pounds UK 
spent collecting evidence, July 2005, was convicted in Old Bailey and got 20 years; 3) Under 
Article 21, the Convention against Torture allows a state to file a complaint against another state 
for failing to fulfil its obligation: to date, not a single complaint has been filed.
3 Due to the ‘changed circumstances’ (as the phrase has it) following September 11, there 
has been an extraordinary escalation in the number and intensity of texts dealing with the problem 
of torture in philosophy, politics, history and law. But obviously it didn’t start there. In addition to 
the texts cited below, I would also mention here: R.D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid (eds), The 
Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); M. Danner, Torture 
and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib and the War on Terror (New York: New York Review of Books, 
2004); K.J. Greenberg (ed.), The Torture Debate in America (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006); 
K.J. Greenberg and J.L. Dratel (eds), The Torture Papers: the road to Abu Ghraib Lewis Anthony 
(intro) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); S. Grey, Ghost Plane: The True Story 
of the CIA Torture Program (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006); J.K. Harbury, Truth, Torture, 
and the American Way: The History and Consequences of US Involvement in Torture (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2005); T. Head (ed.), Is torture ever justified? (Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2005); J. 
Heath, Torture and English Law: An Administrative and Legal History from the Plantagenets to the 
Stuarts (Wesport: Greenwood Press, 1982); J.H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe 
and England in the Ancien Régime (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977); 
S. Levinson (ed), Torture: A Collection (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004); R. Matthews, The Absolute 
Violation: why torture must be prohibited (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008); M.B. 
Merback, The Thief, the Cross and the Wheel: Pain and the Spectacle of Punishment in Medieval 
and Renaissance Europe (London: Reaktion Books, 1999); K. Millet, The Politics of Cruelty: An 
Essay on the Literature of Political Imprisonment (New York & London: Norton, 1994); E. Peters, 
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the point at which law necessarily shades into politics.4 Strangely enough, 
something approximating this thesis has been operative throughout post-
Enlightenment philosophy, if in a minor key; it is, moreover, quite directly 
linked to the centrality of the problematic of language. Even a rapid survey of 
writings by Cesare Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund 
Freud, Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau, Judith Butler, Eric Santner, 
among many others, would have to acknowledge that the problem of torture 
has a crucial place there.5 Why? Because part of the problem of accounting for 
man’s essence as a speaking-being is, from the eighteenth-century onwards, 
necessarily linked to the question of how man comes to language in the first 
place. The question ‘how does man come to language?’ cannot be separated 
from the question concerning questioning, a question whose paradigm is that 
of torture, judicial torture, the elicitation of speech from a resisting body, and 
the implantation and regimentation of particular kinds of speech. Moreover, 
this paradigm is linked to what at least initially might seem its absolute other: 
the elicitation of language from the infant, the one-who-is-not-yet-speaking 
but whose destiny is always already to be caught in the chains of language.
The question concerning technology is therefore also at the heart of these 
political questions, particularly the technologies of the body that Foucault 
himself, in Nietzsche’s wake, has so carefully and ingeniously tracked. But 
I would also want to be very careful about specifying the key technological 
problematic, necessarily subjacent to the others: the necessity for the elicitation 
and control of ‘speech,’ understood as the order of language in general. There are 
of course innumerable different technologies for doing this, and I will discuss 
some of them shortly. In doing so, I will also say why I think even Foucault is 
The Magician, the Witch, and the Law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978) 
and Torture, Expanded Edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996 [1985]); P. 
Reddy, Torture: What you need to know (Charnwood: Ginninderra Press, 2005); K. Roth et al (eds.), 
Torture: does it make us safer? Is it ever ok? (New York: New Press, 2005); E. Scarry, The Body in 
Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
4 Or, in Kristian Williams’ words, ‘Torture…is not incidental to state power; it is 
characteristic of that power. Torture doesn’t represent a system failure; it is the system,’ American 
Methods: Torture and the logic of domination (Cambridge: South End Press, 2006), p. 3.
5 See, inter alia, C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and other writings, ed. R. 
Bellamy, R. Davies et al. (trans) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); F. Nietzsche, 
On the genealogy of morality, ed. K. Ansell-Pearson, trans. C. Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); S. Freud, ‘Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis,’ in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. X (1909), ed. J. Strachey 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1955); M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979); M. de Certeau, Heterologies: Discourse 
on the Other, trans. B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); J. 
Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000); E. Santner, My Own Private Germany: Daniel Paul Schreber’s Secret History of 
Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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sometimes a little misleading on the topic. Indeed, the contemporary context – 
the post-9/11 context in which torture has been explicitly put back on the global 
political agenda – has already foregrounded this problematic, at any number 
of levels. Whether it is the interminable scholarly and legal quibblings over its 
definition, the journalistic furore over whether waterboarding is really torture, 
or Donald Rumsfeld’s little note on the bottom of the notorious memorandum 
from 2002 authorizing extreme interrogation techniques at Guantanamo, 
‘I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?’, one can 
immediately see how micro-technologies of the body, the minutiae of physical 
positions, are imbricated in these calculations. 
In this paper, I will argue that Giorgio Agamben has provided for a radical 
theory of the import of torture on human life, one that, in taking account of all 
of the features mentioned above, provides a different genealogy and projects 
different implications for the relation between torture and politics than have 
otherwise been given. I will begin by examining some of the features of 
the current, post-September 11 ‘debate’ about torture, before moving to an 
exegesis of Agamben’s theses and their import for thinking politics today.
2. The current insistence of the ticking-bomb scenario as prospecti-
ve license for pre-emptive torture
Let me begin by providing an only-too-familiar example of the 
contemporary dominant discourses about torture, whose emblem is the 
sophism of the ‘ticking bomb.’ In his Heidelberg University lecture of 1992, 
Niklas Luhmann opens with precisely such an example:
Imagine: You are a high-level law-enforcement officer. In your 
country – it could be Germany in the not-too-distant future – 
there are many left- and right-wing terrorists – every day there 
are murders, fire-bombings, the killing and injury of countless 
innocent people. You have captured the leader of such a group. 
Presumably, if you tortured him, you could save many lives – 10, 
100, 1000 – we can vary the situation. Would you do it?6
For Luhmann, there is no proper answer to this question: the problem 
as such is properly undecidable for our societies.7 Such an example is at 
6 N. Luhmann, ‘Are There Still Indispensable Norms in Our Society?’ Soziale Systeme, Jg 
14 (2008), Heft 1, p. 18.
7 See the responses to Luhmann’s article in the same issue of Soziale Systeme, especially 
Niels Werber, ‘A Test of Conscience Without Indispensable Norms: Niklas Luhmann’s War on 
Terror’ (83-101) and Costas Douzinas, ‘Torture and Systems Theory’ (110-125).
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once chilling and ludicrous, but its very popularity is certainly an index of 
a kind of Zeitgeist.8 As Costas Douzinas has noted, Luhmann seems to have 
been extraordinarily prescient in his choice of example: a mere decade after 
Luhmann’s presentation, Wolfgang Daschner, a high-ranking Frankfurt police 
officer, threatened to harm the key suspect in the kidnapping of Jakob von 
Metzler, the 11 year old son of a prominent banking family.9 As it happens, 
the suspect decided to talk without further intervention only ten minutes later: 
the boy, it transpired, was already dead. But Luhmann’s apparent prescience 
is in fact a little misleading. As Douzinas adds, ‘The trick is that we have 
to say yes or no to an unreal situation that never happens,’ concluding that 
Luhmann’s position is tantamount to a depoliticisation.10 To some extent this 
is true, but it remains the case that Luhmann’s particular formulation of the 
scenario captures something about torture in the contemporary political space 
that others, apparently very similar, do not.
For one can no longer ignore how popular this example is for those who 
clearly think that the topic of torture can be debated like any other, not to 
mention those who clearly enjoy the possibility of its official return. Hence 
Michael Levin, in a (to my mind repellent) essay titled ‘The Case for Torture,’ 
dating from 1982, when it appeared in Newsweek, lasciviously runs through 
one version of this scenario after another: ‘Suppose a terrorist has hidden 
an atomic bomb on Manhattan Island which will detonate at noon on July 
4 unless….Someone plants a bomb on a jumbo jet….Suppose a terrorist 
group kidnapped a newborn baby from a hospital….’ Levin even announces, 
with staggering sang froid, that ‘there are situations in which torture is not 
merely permissible but morally mandatory.’11 If Levin still stands behind these 
arguments, the best known contemporary proponent of this view is perhaps 
the US civil rights lawyer Alan Dershowitz, who – with an enthusiasm verging 
on the hallucinatory – even denominates this position a ‘new realism.’12 
Examples could be multiplied.
8 It is an example that is in fact ubiquitous following 9/11. For instance, take the well-
known syndicated Fox Network TV series 24, which revels in precisely the same phenomenon.
9 See ‘Police Threat Fuels Debate on Torture,’ Deutsche Welle, 24 February 2003, 
<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,785751,00.html>
10 Douzinas, ‘Torture and Systems Theory,’ p. 111.
11 M. Levin, ‘The Case for Torture,’ Newsweek, June 7, 1982, p. 13.
12 See A. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to 
the Challenge (Yale: Yale University Press, 2003). As Dershowitz – now part of the US wing of 
the international legal team assembled in defence of Julian Assange – puts it, ‘The simple cost-
benefit analysis for employing such nonlethal torture seems overwhelming: it is surely better 
to inflict nonlethal pain on one guilty terrorist who is illegally withholding information needed 
to prevent an act of terrorism than to permit a large number of innocent victims to die,’ p. 144. 
Dershowitz’s position, then, is as follows: 1) cost-benefit analysis recommends torture in certain 
cases; 2) torture is already being done, and we hypocritically pretend to be ignorant of it; 3) 
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As John Kleinig noted in a paper on the mysterious charm of this generic 
fiction:
if it takes the ticking bomb argument to justify torture, we might 
wonder whether it ever justifies any actual torture that we might 
encounter. For, consider what gives the ticking bomb argument 
such persuasiveness as it has:
First, it posits a known – and not merely a possible or even probable 
– threat. Second, there is a pressing need for action. Third, the 
threatened evil is of enormous magnitude. Fourth, only torture is 
likely to succeed in getting the information needed to avert the 
evil. Fifth, the person to be tortured is the perpetrator of the threat. 
And finally, as a result of the torture, the evil is very likely to be 
averted.13
Kleinig also immediately shows how such a scenario is de facto mobilised 
to expand the cases under which torture is allegedly legitimately able to be 
used, and adds that torture is the worst assault on the dignity of the human 
being imaginable insofar as it effects a ‘de-moralisation’ of the individual, 
who is thereby turned against him- or herself. In this, his arguments rejoin 
those of Elaine Scarry or John Parry, or any of the others who find torture 
morally repugnant, an assault on dignity and decency, a contravention of 
fundamental human rights, and so on. But they thereby also come to share 
therefore, it is at once technically correct, legally right, and morally honest to bring torture back 
into law. It is also the case that, to the extent that he is thinking politically, Dershowitz follows 
Bentham’s dictum that ‘Government throughout is but a choice of evils.’ Much like the nouveaux 
philosophes’ defense of human rights as ‘the lesser evil,’ Dershowitz’s position therefore evinces 
its essentially legal-technocratic nature; underneath this position, is a metaphysical position 
consistent with what Alain Badiou has denominated ‘democratic materialism.’ Dershowitz’s 
position is essentially shared by other commentators, such as Adrian Vermeuele and Eric Posner. 
Richard Posner is even prepared to say that torture is clearly legitimate if its purpose is to ‘ward 
off a great evil,’ Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in the Time of National Emergency (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). Indeed, we find the following statement: ‘Even torture may 
sometimes be justified in the struggle against terrorism, but it should not be considered legally 
justified. A recurrent theme of the book is that a nonlegal “law of necessity” that would furnish 
a moral and political but not legal justification for acting in contravention of the Constitution 
may trump constitutional rights in extreme situations,’ p. 12. One can, incidentally, see how 
the proliferation of minutiae themselves function to occlude the extremity and clarity of the 
proposals, shifting the debate onto other grounds. One dominant line, common to the discussants 
aforementioned, runs something like this: of course torture is bad, but it’s sometimes better than 
the other options, so we may as well, nay, indeed we must use it, and the only real question then 
is whether we do it legally or covertly….
13 J. Kleinig, ‘Ticking Bombs and Torture Warrants,’ Deakin Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 
616.
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a peculiar feature with their adversaries who, as Richard Matthews remarks, 
‘defenders of torture curiously focus on the ethics of specific decisions or acts 
of torture,’ that is, on individual decisions.14 Moreover, as David Luban puts 
it, ‘the ticking bomb begins by denying that torture belongs to liberal culture, 
and ends by constructing a torture culture.’15 One can certainly see Luban’s 
diagnosis confirmed in the most recent disquisitions on the subject. 
But there are several further features of the scenario which need to be 
addressed. First, it is at once surprising and unsurprising to find the origins of 
this example in the work of none other than one Jeremy Bentham, whose ‘Of 
Torture,’ which seems to have been part of a longer work titled Plan of a Penal 
Code dating from the late 1770s, speaks of the utility of torture in recapturing 
an arsonist who is going to strike again. One can immediately see how torture 
is unlikely to be excluded from any utilitarian calculations, on the one hand, 
but, on the other, how Benthamite technologies are strongly dedicated to 
minimizing physical punishments in favour of optical-blackmailing ones.16 
It is surely significant to find this example historically linked to democratic 
modernity itself: it seems that this example arises precisely at the moment 
when torture was about to disappear officially and from Western Europe.17 
14 Matthews, The Absolute Violation, p. 10. It is also noteworthy that Matthews, unlike many 
other legalistic-moral defenders of the prohibition on torture, explicitly refuses any appeal to human 
rights or to conceptions of dignity; he also remarks how the arguments for torture tend, above all, 
not to be empirically based, the latter – that is, evidence-based research! – is rather usually a feature 
of the rhetoric of anti-torture campaigners. It is probably worth noting this feature: the pro-torture 
camp claim ‘realism’ for their proposals, although they usually provide no empirical evidence, but 
imaginary scenarios; the anti-torture campaigners speak of ‘principles,’ but provide empirical date 
about the personal, social, political, and spiritual consequences of actually-existing torture practices.
15 David Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb,’ in Greenberg, p. 36.
16 See also Bob Brecher’s book on the subject, entitled Torture and the Ticking Bomb 
(Malden and Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), in which he notes that the ‘scenario remains in crucial 
respects a fantasy; and that the grounds it is said to offer for justifying interrogational torture so as 
to avoid a putative catastrophe are spurious,’ p. x. As he puts it, ‘no argument based on a ticking 
bomb scenario should even get off the ground,’ p. 12. As Joshua Dratel also notes, ‘the “ticking 
time-bomb” rationale ignores the fact that the torture approved in the current context occurred 
well after the detainees’ apprehension, and continued for months, if not years, thereafter. Thus, 
any time-bomb would have ceased ticking, and detonated, long before any torture occurred,’ 
‘The Curious Debate’ in Greenberg, p. 112. Professor Twining’s ‘Bentham on Torture,’ Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (1973), in gives an atomic bomb example; one can see 
the enthusiasm among theorists for inventing their own little version of the sophism.
17 The lack of political understanding continues to vitiate contemporary utilitarian accounts 
in quite extraordinary ways. Take Fritz Allhoff’s Terrorism, ticking time-bombs and torture: a 
philosophical analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), which examines a range 
of arguments, from Bentham’s claims about the scenario to its contemporary critics. Claiming 
that ‘approaching the torture debate by placing a premium on the lives of innocents – rather than 
the putative rights of suspected terrorists – recasts it in a morally significant way.’ Aside from 
the way in which such an assertion clearly and immediately removes all rights from ‘suspects’ 
(i.e., those who have never been found guilty of any crime), Allhoff claims to: a) give a rigorous, 
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In addition, however, to the historical emergence of this sophism at the 
very moment that the conundrum this sophism purports to raise has de facto 
been excluded from real political possibility, we should also mention that 
torture is thereby essentially linked to a radical experience of the multiplicity 
of possible futures, that is, of the opaque heterogeneity of anticipated 
possibilities. With Romanticism, philosophy – as Foucault himself notes – 
starts to become first and foremost a philosophy of time, and the future above 
all as an index and emblem of negativity that hollows out as it necessitates the 
plans of the present.18 One derived logic of Romantic modernity is therefore 
that of technical assaults on the future or what is, strictly speaking, a pre-
emptive speculative strike. This is why Levin, in the article I cited above, can 
so easily announce that ‘I am advocating torture as an acceptable measure 
for preventing future evils,’ and that ‘[b]etter precedents for torture are 
assassination and pre-emptive attack’ [my emphases]. In accordance with 
this logic, of course, it’s hard to know why you couldn’t torture everybody 
on the planet immediately, just to make sure. But the point stands: torture 
is a political technique directed against time. It is surely the solidarity of 
this technico-legal consideration of torture with a generalised technocratic 
ethos of risk-management that supports the fantasy of its proponents that 
the scenario can constitute a ‘realism’ at all. Which leads us to another 
fundamental proposition: the disappearance of torture from the legal system 
immediately gives rise to the conviction that the laws against torture are 
themselves antiquated and anachronistic, ‘unrealistic.’ The paradox of the 
abolition of torture is that its very abolition comes to seem unrealistic in the 
space that that abolition opens up.
In being so, or being considered so, this does something to the status of 
torture itself. For the very calculations made by dirigeants – from Bentham’s 
own ‘felicific calculus’ to the mathematically-modelled insurance schema of 
‘risk society’ –depend on their desiring to remobilise a forbidden technique 
purely ‘philosophical’ account of the moral issues; b) place the debate back where it belongs in 
the context of contemporary terrorism; c) thereby emphasize, not the rights of those who are to 
be tortured but those who may be saved by such torture; d) does so from a utilitarian perspective. 
But Allhoff then misses entirely the properly political dimensions of the ban on torture, as he 
quite rightly queries the rights-based discourses that today are deployed in support of the latter; 
moreover, his shift between the allegedly ‘philosophical’ (quasi-logical) accounts of arguments 
and ‘actual’ situations becomes symptomatically and self-confessedly rhetorical, e.g., ‘the point 
needs only to be that torture operates on a faster timetable than the alternatives’ (146)….even 
though it admittedly may not be fast enough. This, stricto sensu, is tantamount to an argument 
for torturing in the dark. Presumably not coincidentally, Allhoff’s book comes with a back-cover 
testimonial from none other than John Yoo, perhaps best known for his role in the US ‘Torture 
Memos’ advising President George W. Bush.
18 M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 1972-1977, ed. C. Gordon (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 149-150.
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whose limits themselves thereby vanish. As Bentham admits of this aspect of 
torture, ‘The Quantity of Torture is indeterminate.’ What this means is clear, at 
least, to Bentham: that torture can have no particular codification that ensures 
its effectiveness; its effectiveness can be gauged only by results. As such, 
the paradox is that, precisely in order to assure oneself of torture’s clarity 
and utility, what constitutes torture in terms of techniques, times, quantities 
of pain, etc., must become obscure. It is Bentham’s probity of thought in 
this regard that is surely the reason why he vacillated on the benefits of 
torture throughout his life; and, moreover, why Luhmann, unlike those who 
proselytise for torture on the basis of such scenarios, concludes that it is 
properly undecidable. Luhmann is in this the true heir to Bentham insofar as 
he maintains that the scenario cannot not continue to arise in functionally-
differentiated societies such as our own, precisely because systems-operations 
are and must be irreducible to moral considerations, and that all arguments for 
or against torture can therefore and thereafter receive no resolution.
I would like to add two further points here. The first is to ask: given the 
ubiquity of and enthusiasm for torture historically, how did people ever come 
to think that an absolute ban on torture was the only appropriate state of 
affairs?19 Russell Grigg and I have posed this question from the standpoint of 
psychoanalysis.20 On the basis of this approach, Grigg and I would answer: 
the struggle for democracy as equality.21 To this end, we isolated a number of 
propositions that we consider historically invariant:
19 This question is rarely posed, even by serious scholars of the historical record: take C.J. 
Einolf’s recent article ‘The Fall and Rise of Torture: A Comparative and Historical Analysis,’ 
Sociological Theory, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2007), pp. 101-121. Part of the problem is surely the lack 
of properly political understanding by the sociologists and lawyers who, despite their often-
stunning erudition and insights, cannot therefore make the properly political connections. See, 
also in this lineage, somebody like Sanford Levinson who in ‘Slavery and the Phenomenology 
of Torture,’ Social Research, Vol. 74, No. 1 (2007), pp. 149-168, brings the two together as 
evidence of a drive to sovereign control, yet in doing so, has simply restated an ancient truism. 
One of the commentators who has put the liberal defence in genuinely political terms is Luban: 
‘I am arguing that torture is a microcosm, raised to the highest level of intensity, of the tyrannical 
political relationships that liberalism hates the most,’ p. 39.
20 J. Clemens and R. Grigg, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Crime of Torture,’ Australian Feminist 
Law Journal, Vol. 24 (2006), pp. 159-175; republished in M. Kulkarni (ed.), Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on Political Theory (Delhi: Sage, 2011), pp. 236-259. See also J. Clemens, ‘You 
have the right to remain silent,’ Heat, No. 23 (2010), pp. 7-21.
21 For exemplary accounts of the actual role played by torture in democracy, see D.M. 
Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Jinee Lokaneeta, 
Transnational Torture: Law, Violence and Power in the United States and India (New York: New 
York Press, 2011); as well as the Einolf article already cited. While the former two accounts in 
particular track the historical actualities of torture under liberal democracies in detail, including 
making the point that torture returns in democracy as exception, what their studies at once rely 
on yet underplay is that it is only democracy, of all known political systems, that makes in 
principle the exclusion of torture one of the constitutive elements of its inspiration, definition 
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•	 psychoanalytically	 speaking,	 there	 is	 nobody	 who	 does	 not	 enjoy	
the spectacle of torture, albeit often in the mode of denegation or 
disavowal;
•	 torture	is	politically	the	paradigm	of	arbitrary	power;
•	 freedom	of	speech	is	not	and	should	not	be	the	right	to	say	anything,	
but rather the right not to have to speak;
•	 torture	and	pre-publication	censorship	are	essentially twinned;
•	 one	essential	element	of	democracy	 is	 the	exclusion of torture as its 
necessary condition;
•	 the	existence	of	slavery	within	any	society	in	general	is	defined	by	a	
person’s torturability;
•	 one	universal	wrong	of	torture	is	its	confusion-power (e.g., confusion 
of sense and reference, aims and ends, actuality and potentiality, 
persons and voices, etc.)
Let’s note that these are not really ‘ethical’ propositions in the common 
acceptation of ethics today. We refrain from speaking of the inherent 
or essential wrong of cruelty to others, of the mutilation of bodies, of the 
psychological consequences of such practices – although these are of course 
to be condemned. But our point was to speak of the specifically political 
dimensions of torture.22 
This point is often occluded in the literature, including for reasons 
of legal or philosophical specialisation, yet can be rendered legible with a 
slight shift in optic. In the US context, for example, Jeremy Waldron has 
argued that ‘the rule against torture operates in our law as an archetype – 
that is, as a rule which has significance not just in and of itself, but also as 
and practice. This is why, in my opinion, they mistake the animus of all the quite extraordinary 
routines by which liberal democratic officials constantly seek to reintroduce, deny, or redefine 
torture as not essentially anti-democratic acts, but a flaw of the system itself. To my mind, this is 
where psychoanalysis is indispensable: these self-declared ‘democrats’ are in fact essentially anti-
democratic, and need to be re-apprised of the fundamentally political elements of democracy’s 
principled exclusion of torture. On the other hand, psychoanalytically speaking, one would also 
have to agree that the ‘repression’ of torture in democracy is itself a sign of a modality of treating 
torture that allows for its covert return.
22 In other words, Naomi Klein is right to assert that, ‘The widespread abuse of prisoners is 
a virtually foolproof indication that politicians are trying to impose a system…that is rejected by 
large numbers of the people they are ruling. Just as ecologists define ecosystems by the presence 
of certain “indicator species” of plants and birds, torture is an indicator species of a regime that is 
engaged in a deeply anti-democratic project, even if that regime happens to have come to power 
through elections,’ The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (London: Penguin, 
2008), p. 127.
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the embodiment of a pervasive principle,’23 and this comes somewhat close 
to the position offered by José Alvarez in his introduction to ‘Torturing the 
Law’: ‘Lawyers – of all people – should not be addressing torture and cruel, 
inhuman, degrading treatment as if this were just another policy choice over 
which reasonable, civilized people can disagree.’24 However, and this is one 
of the significant aspects of the contemporary discussions of torture – in 
fact, of the post-Romantic discussions more generally – even those against 
torture reason according to a radical depoliticisation of the theme, indeed, 
through a philosophical, moral and/or legal treatment of the theme.25 This is 
as true for Waldron as it is for Levin, for those who take a stringently moral 
position or for those for whom the ticking bomb scenario comes to be the 
only universally-recognised exemplum: in other words, the very democracy 
that excludes torture also occludes the reasons for such an occlusion from its 
subjects. (The ‘Enlightenment’ is occasionally blamed for this occlusion, for 
instance by historians such as John Langbein).
That Grigg and I were able to make this point about the political status of 
torture by means of psychoanalytic theory also seems to us significant. How 
could psychoanalysis, which is so often incapable of dealing with political 
institutions and problems in any plausible way, nonetheless be so incisive in 
this particular context? Precisely because psychoanalysis deals essentially 
with the places at which speech and the body meet. This is self-evidently 
the same place upon which torture operates. Moreover, this recognition 
23 J.E. Alvarez, ‘Torturing the Law,’ Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law,’ 
Vol. 37, No. 2 & 3 (2006), p. 175.
24 See J. Waldron, ‘Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,’ 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 105, No. 6 (October 2005), p. 1687. One can see evidence of the 
shift towards Waldron’s dystopia in the laws regarding rendition; see A. W. Clarke, ‘Rendition 
to Torture: A Critical Legal History,’ Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Fall 2009), pp. 1-74. 
See also the book version in J. Waldron, Torture, Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White 
House (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
25 Exemplary here would be Henry Shue’s moral arguments in ‘Torture,’ Philosophy 
and Public Affairs (1978), as well as his response to the ticking bomb scenario in ‘Torture in 
Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb,’ Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law,’ Vol. 37, No. 2 & 3 (2006), pp. 231-239. What Shue finds the scenario misleading insofar 
as it both idealizes and abstracts: ‘Idealization adds sparkle, abstraction removes dirt,’ p. 231. As 
Shue puts the alleged realism of the legal licensing about torture as helping with its restriction, 
‘Are we to believe that America is likely to be the first alcoholic in history who can take only one 
drink?’ (234) For Shue, ‘torture is an institution’ (236), whose use will ‘metastatize’ throughout 
the social body, and, not least, eats taxpayer’s money. Shue also points to the moral blackmail 
inherent in the scenario: you who deny the realism of this scenario are too squeamish to have any 
plausibility in its discussion! Shue therefore concludes: ‘I now take the most moderate position 
on torture, the position nearest to the middle of the road, feasible in the real world: never again. 
Never, ever, exactly as international law indisputably requires,’ p. 238. See also the other articles 
in the same issue of the journal, which is dedicated to the problem of torture.
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also enables something further to be said about psychoanalysis itself. If 
democracy requires the exclusion of torture as the fundamental guarantee 
of free speech, psychoanalysis ratchets up this requirement to its impossible 
limit: free association, the ‘fundamental rule’ of psychoanalysis, shows that 
such free speech retains traces of the very torture it repudiates, and that the 
elicitation of such speech comes at a cost that cannot itself be spoken. As 
such, psychoanalysis is at once the unprecedented exacerbation of democratic 
principles and their radical subversion.
But this brings me to my second point, the one I will focus on here: 
the very popularity of the ticking-bomb scenario and its interrogational, 
informational arguments for torture masks something that is perhaps more 
sinister and unspeakable. For it is not that contemporary torturers are able to 
extract a rapid and effective confession from suspects by the judicious and 
restricted use of new technologies; it is that the new technologies of torture 
render all information-gathering impossible by rendering their subjects, in 
the language of military PR, neutralised. In this regard, one would have to 
say, echoing Luhmann, that we already inhabit thoroughly post-democratic 
societies, that these societies are indeed without any fundamental norms, 
and that a new dispensation of the torture-polity situation is at the heart of 
these developments. Such a dispensation no longer hinges on the elicitation of 
speech, but upon the absolute obliteration even of its possibility.
I will adduce some evidence, offer some arguments, and draw some 
conclusions about these propositions. To do this, I rely here upon the work 
of Giorgio Agamben on the powers of language, and I will give a brief 
exegesis of three crucial moments in Agamben’s work which have a direct 
bearing on the question of torture: one drawn from his recent short book, 
The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath; one from the short 
essay ‘K,’ published in English in a collection I co-edited with Nick Heron and 
Alexander Murray; and from Remnants of Auschwitz, essentially Agamben’s 
study of Holocaust testimony. Peculiarly, although this is perhaps due only to 
my ignorance rather than to the actual state of affairs, it seems that there is as 
yet no scholarship on this question in Agamben. I will be treating Agamben’s 
extracts in reverse order of their appearance, before concluding with some 
remarks about the consequences for political life today.
3. The SacramenT of Language: an archaeoLogy of The oaTh
The role of the oath in the formation of political communities has been 
well-known and well-studied for some time. As John Spurr puts it in ‘A 
Profane History of Early Modern Oaths,’ ‘Oaths bind lovers, just as they 
adjudicate between litigants. They are constitutive of communes, gilds, 
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fraternities, professions and institutions. They are at the heart of covenanting 
communities and bonds of association.’26 Oaths, in a word, are speech-
practices that bind individuals to communities, at once sacred and profane. As 
one might expect, recent studies in the field – the ones I know best concern 
early-modern England – tend to effect a double move. The first is to mobilize 
a theory of performatives to account for oaths; the second, connected with the 
first, is to insist on the situated nature of the use of oaths, which means that 
part of the point is to avoid undue metaphysical presuppositions or disavowed 
anachronism.27 But this sort of historical polemic is foreign to Agamben.
As Agamben notes of the oath in general, it is indissociably an affirmation, 
an invocation, and a profanation.28 As such, the oath precedes received 
divisions between magic, religion and law that have hitherto governed – 
and, as Agamben demonstrates, often severely bungled – its study. Agamben 
typically pinpoints a key problem in the relevant scholarship, showing how 
this scholarship falsifies its own evidence to the extent that disputes within 
the scholarship come to mirror each other without realising it. He proceeds to 
isolate the key features of the problem, and, by way of close analyses of the 
crucial texts, turns them towards the paradoxes of its invariance. Agamben 
seeks the exposure of an arché within immanence, not the transmission of a 
hermetic transcendence. As he puts it, ‘the arché is not a given, a substance, or 
an event but a field of historical currents stretched between anthropogenesis 
and the present, ultrahistory and history.’29 Here this also means: don’t think 
that the truth of words can be found outside words themselves. But it also 
means: don’t think that an attentiveness to allegedly contextual specifics 
relativises the operations within and upon language. 
It is with this principle in hand that Agamben unlocks the enigma of the 
oath as that primordial function whereby speaking beings try to curtail the 
irreducible possibility of language’s perjuries: the ‘proper context of the oath 
is therefore among those institutions….whose function is to performatively 
affirm the truth and trustworthiness of speech.’30 As such, an oath can only 
be an oath of allegiance to a particular office on the basis of this prior 
26 J. Spurr, ‘A Profane History of Early Modern Oaths’ in Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society (Cambridge: Royal Historical Society, 2001), p. 47.
27 See, for example, ‘often unexamined perspectives can impose an anachronistic 
structure on the past,’ Conal Condren, Argument and Authority in Early Modern England: The 
Presupposition of Oaths and Offices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 11; 
D.M. Jones, Conscience and allegiance in seventeenth century England: the political significance 
of oaths and engagements (University of Rochester Press, 1999).
28 G. Agamben, The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath, trans. A. Kotsko 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
29 Agamben, The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath, p. 11.
30 Ibidem, p. 65.
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operation: the oath is required as a self-reference of language to language 
within language before any putatively reliable reference to the world can take 
place. Agamben: ‘The oath seems, then, to result from the conjunction of 
three elements: an affirmation, the invocation of the gods as witnesses, and a 
curse directed at perjury.’31
The oath, a supplemental ritual declaration, expressed as a futile but 
necessary attempt to stabilize the insuperable rift between words and things, 
inscribes its own futility in its very expression by means of the curse. Some 
people care more for grammar than they do for God, Augustine complained; 
God, as Nietzsche added, is a function of grammar. For Agamben, ‘God’ is 
a name that humans give to the hope that names can reliably name at all, de 
jure if not de facto. But God is then the name for the name of everything that 
cannot not be taken in vain. For if ‘the connection that unites language and 
the world is broken, the name of God, which expressed and guaranteed this 
connection based in blessing, becomes the name of the curse, that is, of a word 
that has broken its truthful relation to things.’32 As Jacques Lacan constantly 
essayed to remind his auditors – and Lacan, not to mention psychoanalysis 
more generally, is possibly the true, if well-secreted prime precursor of 
Agamben’s work – you can’t speak without believing in a God you also can’t 
help but betray in and by that very utterance.33 
But this gives us a real problem. For if ‘every oath swears on the name 
par excellence, that is on the name of God, because the oath is the experience 
of language that treats all of language as a proper name,’34 then how can one 
speak at all without implicitly participating in the oath? Silence, or showing in 
silence, can become one attempt to escape this situation; inventive expressions 
of senselessness is another. But the first, a recurrent tactic of what Alain 
Badiou would call ‘anti-philosophy’ (from Pascal to Lacan himself), finds 
its withdrawal towards muteness becoming indiscernible from that of the 
victims of the powers it would contest. As for the latter, we find a Romantic 
problematic of poetry (or artistic creation) establishing the very politics that 
31 Ibidem, p. 31.
32 Ibidem, p. 42.
33 See J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, trans. B. Fink (Norton: London 
and New York, 1999). For Agamben, ‘If, in polytheism, the name assigned to the god named this 
or that event of language, this or that specific naming, this or that Sondergott, in monotheism 
God’s name names language itself,’ The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath, 
op. cit., p. 49. A Bataillean remark: it is presumably of some interest too, that, while oaths have 
primordially involved the utterance of the names of divinities shorn of their semantic context, the 
rather risible flavour generated today by the utterance of the name of God compared to the banal 
obscenity of the word ‘shit!’ must make one think of the equation shit = God, or, at least, our own 
post-Christian God.
34 Ibidem, p. 53.
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come to foreclose it. Hence, a third way: the practice of philosophy itself, 
which, in Agamben’s words, ‘is constitutively a critique of the oath: that is, 
it puts in question the sacramental bond that links the human to language, 
without for that reason simply speaking haphazardly, falling into the vanity 
of speech.’35 
Yet it is this point that the principle of immanence that enables Agamben’s 
insights in this particular work also curbs them, for it forgoes the question 
of the crossing of the body and its speech. For what of those figures who 
are excluded from swearing an oath at all, but who are nevertheless required 
to appear as the subjects of a legal process in which testimony can be given 
only on oath? I am thinking here of the figure of the slave, whose testimony 
in ancient law could only be admissible if it had been extracted by torture, as 
Agamben himself has noted elsewhere (of which more below). Yet he does not 
acknowledge that torture and the oath are necessarily, if asymmetrically, bound 
together: on his own terms, torture must be the shadow bodily accompaniment 
of the oath, its foundation and truth. It is thus no wonder today, when the oath 
has fallen into desuetude, that torture is explicitly back on the agenda even for 
those democratic states which had prided themselves on their thoroughgoing 
rejection of it. Without any trust in oaths – indeed, having repudiated almost 
altogether their function and efficacy – our contemporary materialist polities 
can imagine no other recourse than direct psychophysical incursions into 
bodies in a forlorn and terrifying attempt to extract ‘reliable’ ‘information.’ 
This enables us to add to our discussion of the ticking-bomb another, perhaps 
unexpected corollary: those who argue for the good of torture today have 
at once unconsciously registered a serious transformation in the status of 
language, the loss of the efficacy of the oath, and, panicked, betray their 
own impotence and thoughtlessness precisely by trying to reinscribe the lack 
within the ‘natural’ ‘human’ body itself. So if Agamben does not name torture 
as such as the corporeal underlining of the oath, he has nonetheless implicitly 
provided a profound explanation for torture’s recent re-emergence on a global 
scale. It is now to another part of Agamben’s oeuvre to which I turn, in which 
he explicitly discusses the role of torture in law.
4. K.O.
It is precisely because Agamben had already dealt with the question of 
torture that its absence from his book on oaths is so noteworthy. One suspects 
that this is partially due to the very difficulty of the articulation. Yet, in an 
essay simply denominated ‘K,’ and dedicated to a doubled reading of Franz 
35 Ibidem, p. 72.
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Kafka’s Trial and The Castle, Agamben speaks directly of this. Noting that 
the letter K for kalumniator was branded on the forehead of those found guilty 
of bringing false accusations in Roman Law, Agamben makes this insight 
the ‘key’ to the Trial: ‘Every man brings a slanderous trial against himself.’36 
In doing so, self-slander ‘calls into question the principle itself of the trial: 
the moment of accusation,’ ‘it puts guilt into question,’ and arraigns the law 
itself at the very threshold of its operations. For Agamben, ‘the accusation is, 
perhaps, the juridical “category” par excellence (kategoria, in Greek, means 
accusation)….The law is….in its essence, accusation, “category.”’37
The paradox is extraordinary: the false accuser has charged himself; if 
he is guilty, he is innocent; if innocent, guilty. Or, more precisely, ‘guilt does 
not exist, or rather, the only guilt is self-slander, which consists in accusing 
oneself of a non-existent guilt (which is to say, of one’s own innocence – and 
this is the comic gesture par excellence).’38 Agamben even discerns a triple 
operation in K’s actions: he slanders himself; he colludes with himself in the 
slander; and he gives way on his own self-slander. As such, this is a ‘strategy 
that aims to deactivate and render inoperative the accusation’39 – from the 
point of the accusation itself.
Such slander, therefore, must be distinguished from confession. As 
Agamben writes:
While in the law of the republican era confession was admitted 
with reservations and used more to defend the accused, in the 
imperial era, above all for crimes against power (conspiracy, 
treason, plot, impiety against the ruler), but also for adultery, magic 
and illicit divination, the criminal procedure involved the torture 
of the accused and his slaves in order to extort a confession from 
them. ‘To extract the truth’ (veritatem eruere) is the emblem of 
the new juridical rationality that, tightly binding confession and 
truth, makes torture – in cases of lèse majesté extended even to 
witnesses – the probatory instrument par excellence. Hence the 
name quaestio that designates it in juridical sources: torture is an 
inquiry into truth (quaestio veritatis)….40
36 G. Agamben, ‘K’ in J. Clemens et al. (eds), The Work of Giorgio Agamben (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2008), p. 14.
37 Ibidem, ‘K,’ p. 15.
38 Ibidem, ‘K,’ p. 14.
39 Ibidem, ‘K,’ p. 16.
40 Ibidem, ‘K,’ p. 18.
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We are thus dealing with not one, but two paired, linked oppositions. On 
a first level, that of linguistic acts, we have the paradox of self-slander, which 
stalls and evades the operations of law qua law of truth, against the act of 
confession, which is the paradigm of the action of law. On a second level, that 
of bodies, we have the peculiar continuation of freedom of movement – K’s 
‘“arrested” condition,’ as Agamben notes, ‘does not entail any change in his 
life’41 – against, not a death-sentence, but the use of torture. Indeed, speaking 
of the murderous, malfunctioning device in In the penal colony, Agamben 
remarks that ‘the true purpose of the machine is…torture as quaestio veritatis; 
death, as often happens in torture, is only a collateral effect of the discovery 
of truth.’42 
A grimly comic struggle ensues between self-slander and self-
condemnation, the dissolution of cause and the violent inscription of marks 
upon the body, in the course of which these antitheses merge and become 
indistinguishable. Hence the strategy of self-slander fails; indeed, becomes 
in turn the strategy by which the law turns its own groundlessness into its 
justification. The trial opened by the accusation will end inevitably in a 
confession, or in a torture-death, which comes to the same thing.
Before I proceed to my third example, let me note a few aspects of 
Agamben’s procedure. Above all, he takes literary texts absolutely seriously 
as providing the most profound analyses of the relation between life and the 
law. Kafka’s text shows precisely what it is unable to say without succumbing 
to precisely the operations of the law it seeks to evade. In its own failure, it 
nonetheless enables what it shows to be said philosophically, that is, a saying 
which seeks to break the bond between law and language without falling into 
what W.H. Auden might have called ‘elderly rubbish’ or ‘drivel.’ Or, to put 
this another way, philosophy is an experiment with examples of language that 
exceed the grip of properties (i.e., those phenomena which can be brought 
under a law identified by science). In doing this, philosophy testifies to a very 
peculiar experience which it does not itself have, but which it discerns above 
all in poetry: a split and impossible experience of the non-relation between 
language and the living body.
5. The muSLim in Auschwitz
The key text of Agamben’s in this regard is Remnants of Auschwitz, 
perhaps the book of Agamben’s that has come in for the most vocal criticisms. 
More particularly, the examination that he provides there of the figure widely 
41 Ibidem, ‘K,’ p. 16.
42 Ibidem, ‘K,’ p. 19.
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known as the Muselmann has proved especially contentious. So Ruth Leys 
charges Agamben with an illicit junking of the affect of guilt in favour of an 
analysis of shame.43 J.M. Bernstein claims that Agamben aestheticises the 
Muselmann’s ‘fate for the sake of a metaphysics of language.’ Mesnard and 
Kahan similarly charge Agamben with misunderstanding the historiographical 
debate and aestheticising the figure. Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer speak 
of this ‘deeply problematic argument of Giorgio Agamben.’44 On the other 
hand, even apparently friendly commentary, such as that as Slavoj Zizek, 
seems to miss the point.45 Perhaps the harshest critic – but also, by that very 
mark, the most illuminating – is perhaps Dominick LaCapra, who writes in 
Heidegger is probably the most important intellectual reference 
point for Agamben, yet Agamben does not try to sort out the 
relations or nonrelations between Heidegger’s philosophical and 
political orientations, notably the implications of his notorious 
postwar silence, or at most equivocal remarks, concerning 
Auschwitz. More generally, I argue that philosophy and theory 
in Agamben are most importantly quasi-transcendental and 
postapocalyptic….in Agamben’s conceptualization of the new, 
history, including experience, is voided of specificity and counts at 
best as an instantiation of transhistorical theoretical concerns and 
postapocalyptic apprehensions.46
43 R. Leys, From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz and After (Princeton: PUP, 2007), esp. ch. 5; 
see also E.M. Vogt, ‘Catastrophic Narratives and Why the “Catastrophe” to Catastrophe Might 
Have Already Happened,’ in S. Jottkandt et al. (eds), The Catastrophic Imperative (Houndsmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 26-52.
44 M. Hirsch and L. Spiter, ‘Holocaust Studies/Memory Studies,’ in Susannah Redstone 
(ed.), Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates (Fordham University Press, 2010), p. 398.
45 So Zizek writes, regarding the ‘Muslims,’ ‘This is why one should insist more than 
ever on their humanity, without forgetting that they are in a way dehumanised, deprived of the 
essential features of humanity: the line that separates ‘normal’ human dignity and engagement 
from the Muslim’s ‘inhuman’ indifference is inherent to ‘humanity,’ which means that there is a 
kind of inhuman traumatic kernel or gap in the very midst of ‘humanity’ itself,’ Did Somebody 
Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion. London: Verso, 2001), p. 77, 
and goes on to compare their situation to that of M. Valdemar in E.A. Poe’s tale. I have written 
elsewhere about just how politically compromised this comparison is, J. Clemens, ‘The Politics 
of Style in the Work of Slavoj Zizek,’ in G. Boucher et al. (eds.), Traversing the Fantasy: Critical 
Responses to Slavoj Zizek (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 3-23.
46 D. LaCapra, History in transit: experience, identity, critical theory (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004), pp. 12-13. LaCapra misunderstands Agamben to the point that he can 
say of the latter’s conception of the Muselmann: ‘The result is an unsituated, extreme mode of 
victimology or identification with the abject and utterly disempowered,’ p. 180. In a similar vein, 
Robert Eaglestone writes that ‘to concentrate on the Muslemanner [sic.] as the “event” at the heart 
of the camps is open to question…The point is not that the focus on the Muselmanner [sic.] is 
wrong, but any focus on any event of the Holocaust is already the result of a theory-laden choice, 
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I think all of these responses, different as they are, are not only radically 
insufficient (even in the simplest sense of clearly not having read what 
Agamben has written), but their disorder is precisely symptomatic of what 
Agamben is trying to analyse. Indeed, the disorder of Remnants of Auschwitz 
itself which, as a glance at the text will immediately testify, fails to achieve the 
consistency of, say, Homo Sacer, The Time that Remains or The Sacrament of 
Language, is itself testimony to the difficulty of this subject-matter.
Indeed, this is one of the first phenomena that Agamben notes in his 
discussion: that ‘It is a striking fact that although all witnesses speak of him as 
a central experience, the Muselmann is barely named in the historical studies 
on the destruction of European Jewry.’47 Relying on the testimony of witnesses 
themselves, including Primo Levi and Jean Amery – and not only or primarily 
upon subsequent historiography, Agamben attempts to bring to light some 
of the consequences of the appearance of such a creature. As survivors such 
as Levi testify, if the Nazis perpetrated mass industrial genocide in the death 
camps, another kind of personage emerged as an unintended, unexpected by-
product. Often denominated the ‘Muselmann’ – although there were regional 
variations in the jargons of different camps – this personage is crucial for 
Agamben insofar as what philosophy had always maintained was the essence 
of the human (its capacity for language) had been fully stripped from the 
Muselmänner. The Muselmann survived as a biological organism, but could 
no longer be tolerated as human not only by the Nazis, but by fellow-camp 
inmates themselves.48 The classical figure that Levi invokes in this regard 
and will already lead to certain conclusions and answers,’ The Holocaust and the Postmodern 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 322. Eaglestone continues that, second, Agamben 
could also look at colonialism and, third, from a Levinasian perspective that his ‘bare life is too 
bare, too much like Heidegger’s abstract Dasein,’ p. 323. Such remarks entirely fail to understand 
Agamben’s attention to the relationships between language and the body, which is at once the 
thread of his examinations, and which then are punctuated by irreversible events: the Muselmann 
is that for ‘Auschwitz’ precisely because it is: i) an unintended byproduct (i.e., not consciously 
planned, an ‘accident’) of; ii) industrial genocidal processes (i.e., technologically novel), which; 
iii) exacerbates by an unprecedented actualisation the separation between language and the body. 
Moreover, such a focus hardly ‘will already lead to certain conclusions and answers,’ given that 
Agamben’s ‘focus’ (which he takes from the testimonies of camp survivors themselves) leads 
to genuinely novel propositions about the operations of Nazi genocide. It is precisely this that I 
believe offends those in the ‘discipline’ of ‘Holocaust studies.’
47 G. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. D. Heller-
Roazen (New York: Zone, 1999), p. 34.
48 Agamben had briefly invoked this figure previously in the last moments of Homo 
Sacer: ‘der Muselmann – a being from whom humiliation, horror, and fear had so taken away all 
consciousness and all personality as to make him absolutely apathetic (hence the ironical name 
given to him).... He no longer belongs to the world of men in any way; he does not even belong 
to the threatened and precarious world of the camp inhabitants who have forgotten him from the 
very beginning. Mute and absolutely alone, he has passed into another world without memory 
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is that of the Gorgon, the creature that to look on directly entails one’s 
own paralysis and destruction, and defines the Muselmann as ‘he who has 
seen the gorgon.’ Agamben in fact reads the apparition of this figure as an 
absolute limit, ‘the final biopolitical substance to be isolated in the biological 
continuum.’49 Why? Because the Western philosophical tradition had always 
considered the ‘essence of man’ to be the animal with language – it is precisely 
this characterisation that Agamben has visited in an earlier text, Language 
and Death50 – what the Muselmann literally incarnates is that a creature, the 
‘human,’ a biological creature endowed with language, can be stripped of its 
essence in actuality. This is why Agamben can remark that ‘The Muselmann 
is not only or not so much a limit between life and death; rather, he marks 
the threshold between the human and the inhuman.’51 The human being 
can thereafter be consigned by the most extreme expressions of sovereign 
power (the camps, contemporary torture) to a kind of undead, unspeaking 
subsistence. The potential for speech (to speak or not) had therefore been 
expropriated from the Muselmänner; it would be impossible for a Muselmann 
to say ‘I am a Muselmann.’ As a consequence, survivor testimonies exhibit an 
extraordinary structure. They testify in language to an experience which the 
writers state that they did not and could not have had, that is, the experience of 
being-stripped of the possibility of having an experience at all (i.e., language). 
This at once reveals something essential about the relationship between 
human language-use and political power (humans beings can be separated by 
power from their own essence) as they contest it (the witness confronts and 
resists this possibility).52
All the other extreme procedures familiar from the literature – mass 
extermination, selections, scientific experiments upon inmates, the 
organisation of the Sonderkommando – had had precedents elsewhere, and 
did not in themselves constitute a radical novelty, but an expansion and 
intensification of existing political techniques.53 What the Muselmann shows 
and without grief. For him, Hölderlin’s statement that ‘at the extreme limit of pain, nothing 
remains but the conditions of time and space’ holds to the letter,’ Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power 
and Bare Life, trans. D. Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 185. In 
Remnants, he returns to the figure in a much more attentive and disturbing way. 
49 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, op. cit., p. 85.
50 See G. Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. K.E. Pinkus with 
M. Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).
51 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, op. cit., p. 55.
52 This paragraph repeats and extends part of my entry for ‘Language,’ in The Agamben 
Dictionary, ed. A. Murray and J. Whyte (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), pp. 
118-19.
53 However, see also J.-C. Milner, Les penchants criminals de l’Europe démocratique 
(Paris: Verdier, 2003), in which he notes that the ‘Jew’ was in fact that creature for whom a new 
technology (of destruction) was invented.
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is that the ‘ethical lesson’ of the camps is not simply a matter of numbers or 
of intention or of technology. Leaving aside the well-known difficulties of 
such accountancy procedures, it’s the question of a remnant – that which has 
gone almost undiscussed in the 50 years since Auschwitz. What Auschwitz 
constituted that was radically and irreversibly new was not simply human 
corpses in unprecedented numbers, but a structure which inadvertently 
produced humans who-were-no-longer-human as a kind of industrial waste-
product. Unfortunately, this also means that – however desperately one would 
like to keep to these ideals – ‘dignity,’ ‘human rights,’ and ‘rule of law’ are 
no longer viable categories for thinking through what actually happened, for 
what has been actualised and cannot be wished away. As Agamben says: ‘This 
is also why Auschwitz marks the end and the ruin of every ethics of dignity 
and conformity to a norm. The bare life to which human beings were reduced 
neither demands nor conforms to anything. It itself is the only norm; it is 
absolutely immanent.’54 The equal and inalienable rights which derive from 
the inherent dignity of the human person cannot be viably sustained, even as 
a legal fiction: the problematic of the survivor has exceeded the frame of the 
trial, including in the projective forms of reparation- or war-crimes tribunals.
One of the unbearable revelations of Auschwitz is that the Muselmann-
witness dyad is fundamental to being human: that the human biopolitical 
substance can be irremediably separated from language as such, from what 
makes it human. As Jessica Whyte writes, ‘Agamben, unlike Heidegger, does 
not therefore see Auschwitz as simply one among a list of manifestations 
of technological nihilism, but as something radically new – and what was 
new was not so much the mass industrial production of death as the creation 
of the Muselmann, as the final point on a biopolitical continuum, beyond 
which “there is only the gas chamber.”’55 I truly cannot see how this is an 
‘aestheticization.’ What was created inadvertently was subsequently captured 
technologically: US interrogation techniques are now allegedly able to destroy 
anyone as a person forever within one hundred hours.56
54 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, op. cit., p. 69.
55 See J. Whyte, Catastrophe and Redemption: the Political Thought of Giorgio Agamben, 
unpublished book manuscript.
56 Through a combination of sensory deprivation, drugs, noise, ‘dietary management,’ 
‘sleep management,’ electroshock, neurosurgery, etc. See, for a rare public notice of these 
techniques, N. Klein, ‘The US Psychological Torture System is Finally On Trial,’ The Guardian, 
23 February 2007, p. 41.
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6. Conclusion
We have recently seen the re-instrumentalisation of the spectre of torture 
as a device for turning the panic of contingency attendant on the contemporary 
crisis of state legitimacy into the licensing of arbitrary state power as the 
solution to this crisis. Indeed, this aspect clearly underwrites the circulation 
of the Abu Ghraib photographs. These images are not based on any natural 
language, and hence able to convey their message of universal torturability 
universally, that is, technically; or, to put this differently, they concern a 
lesson at the level of perceptibility, not language. Coterminously, torture has 
now been explicitly legitimated in the oldest democracies through its legal-
medical redefinition. Between 2002-2006, The Office of Legal Counsel for 
the US Justice Department, exemplified by the notorious ‘Bybee memo,’ 
enabled torture to emerge ‘under the color of law.’57 It is not so well known 
but a salient fact that Bybee memo drew on the health benefits clause of the 
non-US Citizens Statute Title 8 USC Sec. 1369, from the section ‘Emergency 
Medical Condition’ to define what separated the cruel, inhumane or degrading 
from torture, viz., 
For purposes of this section, the term ‘emergency medical 
condition’ means a medical condition (including emergency labor 
and delivery) manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient 
severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate 
medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in – 
(1) placing the patient’s health in serious jeopardy,
(2) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(3) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
So only death, organ failure or serious impairment of bodily functions now 
counted as torture under this redescription, a redescription which therefore 
licenses all other practices up to those points. Note that in these cases, all 
the contemporary available terms for any public debate around torture – the 
ticking bomb, the necessity to urgently extract information that will save the 
lives of innocents – has no role to play here whatsoever. Except, that is, for the 
fact of legitimizing torture by the legitimizing of the discussion about torture.
So the relation between torture and the political that I began by sketching 
seems, in the wake of Agamben’s demonstrations – and all the evidence – 
exactly as the defenders of torture often suggest, if for completely different 
57 I owe details regarding the Bybee memo and its usage to an unpublished paper by Peter 
Hutchings, ‘Invented Sovereignty and the Bush Presidency,’ Australasian Society for Continental 
Philosophy Annual Conference, 14 December 2011.
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reasons, archaic. We no longer live in active polities, but in administrative 
waste-management societies. If democracy has historically defined itself by 
its repression of torture in order to enable ‘free speech’ – not simply to be able 
to say anything in public, but be able to speak publicly or not, in your own 
name, without coercion – it is now essentially over. Contemporary torture is 
no longer about the extraction of speech from the body, but the absolute and 
irreversible separation of speech from the body. Perhaps this feature alone 
is enough to render the whole ‘debate’ utterly otiose. In any case, it seems 
that Agamben’s diagnoses are essentially correct, insofar as they manage 
to reconstruct a logic for apparently diverse phenomena (the ticking-bomb 
debate, testimony, oaths, etc.), which then also illuminate certain occlusions, 
opacities and undecidabilities in the debate. If this is indeed the case, then 
existing methods of political disputation and contestation will hardly be 
adequate to the challenge of our own torturing present.
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